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1 Introduction
This paper explores mathematical conditions that are su¢cient and necessary for the ex-
istence of unique point-rationalizable solutions of strategic games. Point-rationalizability
(cf. Bernheim 1984, Moulin 1984, and Pearce 1984) belongs to the class of iterative so-
lution concepts as an alternative to equilibrium solution concepts for the solution of
strategic games. However, games with a unique point-rationalizable solution are espe-
cially attractive from the equilibrium approach’s perspective as well: a unique point-
rationalizable solution is not only the unique Nash equilibrium of the game but the
epistemic interpretation of point-rationalizability provides also a plausible justi…cation
for equilibrium play even if this game is only played in one-shot strategic situations.
Moulin (1984) and Bernheim (1984) present su¢cient conditions for a unique point-
rationalizable strategy that are based on contraction properties of the best response
function. The …ndings of this paper extend Bernheim’s and Moulin’s uniqueness results
with respect to contraction properties of the best response function and to the generality
of considered strategy sets.
Equilibrium concepts presume that players’ strategy choices are an equilibrium point
in the sense of Nash (1950). Presuming that each player forms expectations (beliefs)
about the play of her opponents a Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as a strategy
pro…le such that each player’s expectation is con…rmed by the actual strategy choices
of her opponents. When a game is repeated over and over some learning mechanism
may be regarded as a justi…cation for equilibrium play; however, for games that are
just one-shot strategic situations (or that are not repeated very often) the question of
how players shall be able to form correct expectations about their opponents’ strategy
choices may be di¢cult to answer.
Iterative concepts try to solve a game via elimination of sequentially unreasonable
strategies. As a particular iterative solution concept point-rationalizability starts out
with the assumption that a player will not choose a strategy which is not a best response
to any strategy pro…le of her opponents. If this assumption results in an elimination
of strategies the complexity of the problem is reduced. In the next step strategies
are eliminated that are not best responses to some strategy pro…le that survived the
…rst elimination round, and so forth. If this process converges to some nonempty set of
strategies such that every strategy in this set is a best response to another strategy in this
set, these remaining strategies are labeled as point-rationalizable. This process of iterated
elimination of strategies which are not best-responses can be understood as a formal
description of a player’s internal process of reasoning under the epistemic assumption
that it is common knowledge of the players that only best responses are chosen (cf. Pearce
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1984, Tan and Werlang 1988, Guesnerie 2002). Consequently, under the assumption
that each player engages exactly in this process of internal reasoning the set of point-
rationalizable strategies describes a solution of the game that does neither require correct
ex-ante beliefs nor any learning from previous play.
For games with a unique point-rationalizable solution the point-rationalizable strategy
coincides with the unique Nash equilibrium of this game. As a consequence a good answer
can be given for these particular games to the equilibrium approach’s problem of how
players might arrive in one-shot strategic situations at correct expectations about their
opponents’ strategy choices: The players just have to engage in the internal process of
reasoning, as presumed by the point-rationalizability approach, and will then end up
with correct expectations about their opponents’ strategy choices.
Bernheim (proposition 5.5 in Bernheim 1984) derives a su¢ciency condition for
unique point-rationalizable strategies which states that a point-rationalizable strategy
is unique if the best response function is a contraction mapping in the Euclidean metric
with a su¢ciently fast contraction whereby the speed of the contraction has to increase
in the number of players, #I, of a given game. In particular, the contraction speed of
the best response function f : S ! S is characterized by the following formula whereby
the strategy set S is a compact subset of Rn and d (s; t) = ks¡ tk2, s; t 2 S, denotes
the Euclidean metric
d (f (s) ; f (t)) <
d (s; t)p
(#I ¡ 1)
The proof of Theorem 4 in Moulin (1984) reveals that - independent of the number
of players - a contraction of the best-response function in the supremum norm implies a
unique point-rationalizable strategy if the individual strategy sets Si, i 2 I, are compact
and convex subsets of R.
This paper extends these existing uniqueness results in several respects. As a …rst
result (Theorem 1) we identify mathematical conditions that are su¢cient for a unique
point-rationalizable solution in games with arbitrary metrizable strategy sets. For com-
pact strategy sets we characterize (Theorem 2) uniqueness of the point-rationalizable
solution by a su¢cient and necessary condition. We de…ne then the mathematical con-
cept of T-contractivity (respectively, T-contraction) such that a best response function
is T-contractive if and only if the distance between strategy pro…les which obtain from a
T-fold application of the best response function is smaller than the distance between its
arguments. We show that T-contractivity (respectively, T-contraction) of the best re-
sponse function is a su¢cient uniqueness condition for compact (respectively, complete
and bounded) strategy sets (Theorem 3, respectively, Theorem 5). Moreover, if the
strategy set of a game is …nite T-contractivity is a su¢cient and necessary uniqueness
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condition (Theorem 4).
For games with di¤erentiable individual best response functions and compact real-
valued individual strategy sets we derive properties of the …rst-order partial derivatives
of the individual best response functions that verify (Theorem 6) uniqueness of the
point-rationalizable solution. Furthermore, we will apply these …ndings to an economic
problem raised by Bernheim (1984): Bernheim observes that virtually every output-
decision becomes point-rationalizable in a classical model of Cournot competition - pos-
sessing a unique Nash equilibrium - if there are at least three competitors. Our result
demonstrates that Bernheim’s pessimistic result does not necessarily apply when we
admit marginal changes in a …rm’s presumed inverse demand function. In our model
of Cournot competition between three …rms 1-contractivity is not satis…ed, however, we
can establish uniqueness of the point-rationalizable solution by showing 2-contractivity of
the best response function. Thus, our model of Cournot competition also demonstrates
an applicational advantage that arises from the generalization of uniqueness conditions
from simple contractivity, i.e., T = 1, to general T-contractivity with T ¸ 1.
A result by Milgrom and Roberts (the second corollary at p. 1266 in Milgrom
and Roberts 1990) implies an alternative uniqueness condition for point-rationalizable
solutions: The point-rationalizable solution of a supermodular game is unique if and
only if the Nash equilibrium is unique. Thus, for supermodular games the existence
of a unique …xed point of the best response correspondence is su¢cient for a unique
point-rationalizable solution, which is not true for strategic games in general. Since
the uniqueness conditions of this paper entail unique …xed points, they can be applied
to supermodular games for establishing unique point-rationalizable solutions. In this
context it may be of interest that we generalize a …xed point theorem due to Edelstein
(1962) by showing that a T-contractive mapping on a compact set has a unique …xed
point for any T ¸ 1 and not only for T = 1 (cf. remark 2 in section 3).
Supermodular games (cf. Topkis 1979, Vives 1990, Milgrom and Roberts 1990)
have to satisfy rather strong conditions: strategy sets are complete lattices, the util-
ity functions are supermodular and they exhibit increasing di¤erences. In contrast, our
uniqueness conditions refer only to properties of the best response function whereas no
assumptions with respect to utility functions are imposed. Our uniqueness conditions
are therefore also applicable to non-supermodular games such as games with decreasing
best response functions (e.g., Cournot competition with more than two …rms, cf. The-
orem 4.2. (iii) in Vives 1990). However, the unique point-rationalizable solution of a
supermodular game has the advantage to coincide with the unique strategy that survives
iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies. In the concluding section 6 we ex-
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plain why this coincidence is desirable and we mention possible extensions of this paper’s
uniqueness conditions to other iterated solution concepts than point-rationalizability.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce basic
de…nitions and observations. The main uniqueness results are presented in section 3,
and in section 4 we derive further results under the assumption that the best response
functions are di¤erentiable on compact real-valued strategy sets. We apply in section 5
the …ndings of section 4 to demonstrate uniqueness of the point-rationalizable solution
in a model of Cournot competition with three …rms. Finally, section 6 concludes by
relating this paper’s uniqueness results to other iterative solution concepts.
2 Notation, Preliminaries
For a …nite set of players, I, let G = (Si; fi)i2I denote a game in normal form with
Si as individual strategy set of player i. Furthermore, fi : S¡i ! 2Si denotes the
individual best response correspondence such that fi maximizes player i’s preference
ordering over Si £S¡i. If all individual best response correspondences are single-valued
we call f : S ! S with f (s) = £Ii=1fi (s¡i) the best response function of G and we write
s = f (t) instead of s 2 f (t).
De…nition. (Bernheim 1984, Moulin 1984, Pearce 1984)
The set of point-rationalizable strategies of a game G is given by
P (G) =
1\
k=0
¸k (S)
such that
¸k (S) =
[
s2¸k¡1(S)
f (s)
and ¸0 (S) = S.
Whenever P (G) is a singleton, i.e., there exists a unique point-rationalizable strategy,
we speak of a unique point-rationalizable solution of G. For a given best response
function f …x now some k 2 N and de…ne inductively the function fk : S ! S by
fk (s) = f
¡
fk¡1 (s)
¢
with f 0 (s) = s. The following result is easily veri…ed:
Observation 1. Given a game G with a best response function f . If s = fk (s)
for some k ¸ 1 then
s; f (s) ; :::; f k¡1 (s) 2 P (G)
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Thus, while a Nash equilibrium ofG is by de…nition a …xed point of the best response
function f, i.e., of f k with k = 1, each …xed point of any function fk with k ¸ 1 is a
point-rationalizable strategy of G.
Observation 2. If there exists unique point-rationalizable strategy s¤ of a game G
then s¤ is also the unique Nash equilibrium of G.
Proof: If s¤ is a point-rationalizable strategy then s¤ 2 ¸k (S) for all k 2 N. More-
over, there must exist some strategy s 2 ¸k (S) for all k 2 N such that s¤ 2 f (s), which
implies s 2 P (G), i.e., s is also a point-rationalizable strategy. Because there exists by
assumption a unique point-rationalizable strategy we must have s¤ = s and therefore
s¤ 2 f (s¤), i.e., s¤ is a Nash equilibrium. By Observation 1 this Nash equilibrium is
unique.¤
3 Main Results
Throughout this section we presume that the strategy set S can be described as a subset
of a metric space (X; d) for some given metric d : X£X !R+[+1. Before we proceed
recall that the diameter of some subset A of the metric space (X; d) is de…ned by
diam (A) = supfd (s; t) : s; t 2 Ag
Theorem 1. Given a game G such that
(A1) There exists a continuous best response function f .
(A2) S is a nonempty subset of some metric space (X; d).
Then there exists a unique point-rationalizable strategy s¤ of G if
(i) limk!1 fk (s) = s¤ for some s 2 S, and
(ii) limk!1diam
¡
¸k (S)
¢
= 0.
Proof: Continuity of f on S ½ (X; d) and condition (i) imply
lim
k!1
fk+1 (s) = lim
k!1
f
¡
fk (s)
¢
= f (s¤)
Moreover
lim
k!1
fk+1 (s) = lim
k!1
fk (s) = s¤
and therefore
s¤ = f (s¤)
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Thus, P (G) is nonempty by Observation 2 since s¤ is a …xed point of f.
Suppose now on the contrary that s¤; t¤ 2 P (G) with s¤ 6= t¤, i.e., diam (P (G)) > 0.
Since P (G) ½ ¸k (S) for all k 2 N we obtain
lim
k!1
diam
¡
¸k (S)
¢ ¸ diam (P (G)) > 0
A contradiction to condition (ii).¤
Theorem 2. Given a game G such that
(A1) There exists a continuous best response function f .
(A2’) S is a nonempty and compact subset of some metric space (X; d).
Then there exists a unique point-rationalizable strategy of G if and only if
lim
k!1
d
¡
fk (t) ; fk (s)
¢
= 0
for all s; t 2 S.
Proof: Observe at …rst that each set ¸k (S), k ¸ 0, is compact and nonempty
because continuity of f inherits compactness and nonemptiness. Since ¸k (S) ½ ¸k¡1 (S)
for all k 2 N, P (G) is compact and nonempty as an in…nite intersection of compact
and nonempty nested sets, (cf. Theorem 2.36 and the corollary in Rudin 1976, p.38).
Moreover,
diam (P (G)) = max
s;t2P (G)
d (s; t)
= d (s¤; t¤)
for some s¤; t¤ 2 P (G). By continuity of d there exist s; t 2 S with limk!1 fk (s) = s¤
and limk!1 fk (t) = t¤ such that
lim
k!1
d
¡
fk (s) ; fk (t)
¢
= d (s¤; t¤)
The assumption limk!1d
¡
fk (s) ; fk (t)
¢
= 0 implies then diam (P (G)) = 0, i.e., P (G)
is singlevalued. The only-if part is obvious.¤
De…nition. Fix some T 2 N.
The best response function f is said to be T-contractive if f T is contractive, i.e.,
d
¡
fT (s) ; fT (t)
¢
< d (s; t) for all s; t 2 S with s 6= t.
The best response function f is said to be a T-contraction if fT is a contraction,
i.e., there exists some c 2 (0; 1) such that d ¡f T (s) ; f T (t)¢ · c ¤ d (s; t) for all s; t 2 S
.
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Theorem 3. Given a game G such that
(A1) There exists a continuous best response function f .
(A2’) S is a nonempty and compact subset of some metric space (X; d).
Then there exists a unique point-rationalizable strategy of G if the best response
function f is T-contractive.
Proof: Proceed as in the proof of Theorem 2 and observe that there exist s; t 2 S
with limk!1 fk (s) = s¤ and limk!1 f k (t) = t¤ such that
lim
k!1
d
¡
fk (s) ; fk (t)
¢
= d (s¤; t¤)
d (s¤; t¤) = diam (P (G))
Continuity of f implies continuity of fT and we have therefore
lim
k!1
d
¡
fT
¡
fk (s)
¢
; f T
¡
f k (t)
¢¢
= d
¡
fT (s¤) ; f T (t¤)
¢
Since fT (s¤) ; fT (t¤) 2 P (G) we obtain
d (f (s¤) ; f (t¤)) · diam (P (G)) = d (s¤; t¤)
which is a contradiction to T-contractivity whenever d (s¤; t¤) 6= 0. Thus, P (G) must be
singlevalued.¤
Theorem 4. Given a game G such that
(A1’) There exists a best response function f .
(A2”) S is nonempty and …nite.
Then there exists a unique point-rationalizable strategy of G if and only if
fm (s) = fm (t)
for all s; t 2 S whereby m = #S.
Proof: Delegated to the appendix.
Theorem 5. Given a game G such that
(A1) There exists a continuous best response function f.
(A2”’) S is a nonempty, bounded, and complete subset of some metric space (X; d).
Then there exists a unique point-rationalizable strategy of G if the best response
function f is a T-contraction.
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Proof: Delegated to the appendix.
Remark 1. At …rst glance the assumption of a best response function, i.e., a single-
valued best response correspondence, appears as a severe restriction for the application
of the obtained uniqueness results. However, these uniqueness results extend immedi-
ately to any game with a multi-valued best response correspondence such that this best
response correspondence reduces after …nitely many elimination-rounds (according to
the de…nition of point-rationalizability) to a best response function for the remaining
strategies.
Remark 2. In the proof of Theorem 5 (see appendix) we assure existence of point-
rationalizable strategies by a …xed point theorem due to Bonsall (cf. Theorem 1.3 in
Bonsall 1962) which is basically an extension of the famous Banach …xed point theorem
from 1-contractions to T-contractions. In contrast, the proofs of Theorem 1-4 include,
respectively imply, their own …xed point theorems. For example, Theorem 3, combined
with Observation 2, establishes the existence of a unique …xed point for T-contractive
functions on compact sets. This result generalizes a …xed point theorem of Edelstein
(cf. Remark 3.1. in Edelstein 1962, and Theorem 1.6 in Bonsall 1962) who proves the
existence of a unique …xed point for 1-contractive functions on compact sets.
4 Di¤erentiable Best Response Functions
In this section we exploit the fact that for continuously di¤erentiable individual best
response functions T-contraction of f can be veri…ed by conditions imposed on the
partial derivatives of fT .
Theorem 6. Given a game G such that
(A1”) Each Si is a nonempty, compact, and convex subset of R.
(A2””) Each individual best response function fi is continuously di¤erentiable.
Then there exists a unique point-rationalizable strategy of G
(i) if for each player i X
j2I
¯¯¯¯
@f Ti
@sj
(s)
¯¯¯¯
< 1 (1)
for all s 2 S, for some T ¸ 1, or
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(ii) if for each player j X
i2I
¯¯¯¯
@f Ti
@sj
(s)
¯¯¯¯
< 1 (2)
for all s 2 S, for some T ¸ 1.
Proof: Delegated to the appendix.
Remark 1. The uniqueness conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 6 represent special
applications of the mean-value inequality for functions fT : Rn ! Rn, i.e.,°°f T (s)¡ fT (t)°° · ¯¯DfT (r)¯¯
M
¤ ks¡ tk
wherebyDfT (r) =
³
@fTi
@sj
(r)
´
i=1;:::;I;j=1;:::I
denotes the matrix of …rst-order partial deriva-
tives and r 2 S maximizes some matrix-norm j¢jM over the elements in
f¸s+ (1 ¡ ¸) t j ¸ 2 [0; 1]g
which is compatible with the norm k¢k. For example, condition (1) implies T-contraction
of f in the supremum norm k¢k1 because the absolute row-sum norm of a matrix is
compatible with the supremum norm k¢k1. Analogously, the condition (2) is implied by
the fact that the absolute column-sum norm of a matrix is compatible with the absolute
value norm k¢k1. Consequently, whenever there is a compatible matrix-norm j¢jM for
some norm k¢k (with S ½ (X; d) and d (s; t) = ks¡ tk) such that
¯¯
DfT (r)
¯¯
M
< 1 for
some T ¸ 1, then uniqueness of the point-rationalizable solution is established. As
another example for a compatible matrix-norm observe that the spectrum norm of a
matrix, given by¯¯
DfT (r)
¯¯
M
= maxEigenvalue
³
Df T (r) ¤ ¡Df T (r)¢trans´
is compatible with the Euclidean norm k¢k2. Thus, whenever the maximal singular value
of Df T (r) is strictly smaller than 1 for all r 2 S the point-rationalizable solution must
be unique.
Remark 2. The uniqueness conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 6 are most easily
veri…ed for 1-contraction. For T = 1 inequality (1) becomesX
j 6=i
¯¯¯¯
@fi
@sj
(s)
¯¯¯¯
< 1
for all i and all s 2 S, and inequality (2) becomesX
i6=j
¯¯¯¯
@fi
@sj
(s)
¯¯¯¯
< 1
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for all j and all s 2 S. The former of these two contraction-conditions is already implied
by Theorem 4 in Moulin (1984): Moulin shows in the proof of his Theorem 4 that an
equivalent formulation of this contraction-condition (in terms of second-order partial
derivatives of the utility functions) guarantees a unique point-rationalizable strategy.
5 An Economic Example: Cournot Competition with
Three Firms
A Cournot duopoly with linear inverse demand functions possesses a unique Nash equi-
librium as well as a unique point-rationalizable strategy. However, as Bernheim (1984)
observes, any output between zero and the Monopoly-output is point-rationalizable when
we consider Cournot oligopolies with three (or more) …rms despite the fact that the Nash
equilibrium remains unique regardless of the number of competitors. Basu (1992) ex-
tends Bernheim’s result to a large class of symmetric Cournot oligopolies by showing that
a wide range of output decisions becomes point-rationalizable if su¢ciently many …rms
belong to the oligopoly. Therefore, since Cournot oligopolies are the standard models
in industrial organization theory for the description of output competition among …rms,
it is quite disappointing that point-rationalizability performs here rather poorly as a
predictive solution concept by admitting virtually any output decision.
For the remainder of this section we focus on Bernheim’s result regarding Cournot
competition with three …rms and demonstrate that uniqueness of the point-rationalizable
output decision can already be established under the assumption of marginal deviations
from the original model description of Cournot competition. Moreover, our model pro-
vides an example for the usefulness of T-contractivity, T ¸ 1, compared to mere 1-
contractivity: the best response function will be 2-contractive but not 1-contractive in
the supremum or in the absolute value norm.
Consider a Cournot oligopoly of three …rms such that the utility function of …rm
i 2 f1; 2; 3g is given by
Ui (s) = (Pi (si)¡ c) si (3)
with si 2 [0; 1] as output, c 2 (0; 1) as marginal cost, and Pi as inverse demand function
of …rm i. Moreover, presume the following inverse demand functions
P1 (s) = P2 (s) = max f0; 1¡ s1 ¡ s2 ¡ s3g
P3 (s) = max f0; 1¡ s1 ¡ (1¡ ")s2 ¡ s3g
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for some given " 2 [0; 1]. As individual best response functions we obtain then
f1 (s¡1) = max f0; 0:5 (1¡ s2 ¡ s3 ¡ c)g
f2 (s¡2) = max f0; 0:5 (1¡ s1 ¡ s3 ¡ c)g
f3 (s¡3) = max f0; 0:5 (1¡ s1 ¡ (1¡ ") s2 ¡ c)g
For " = 0 the standard Cournot oligopoly with linear inverse demand functions
obtains for which Bernheim observes that any output decision between zero and the
monopoly output, i.e., any individual strategy in the interval
£
0; 1¡c2
¤
, is point ratio-
nalizable. For example, the monopoly output is a …rm’s best response to zero outputs
of the other …rms whereas such a zero output can be vice versa justi…ed as a …rm’s
best response to monopoly outputs of the other …rms, thereby closing the circle of point
rationalizable reasoning.
Assume now that " > 0. The output decision of …rm 2 has then less impact on the
demand for …rm 3’s product than in the original model of Cournot competition with
linear inverse demand functions. Thus, we interpret " here as a measures for the degree
by which …rm 2’s product is not any longer a perfect substitute for …rm 3’s product on
the market of …rm 3.
Because the individual best response functions fi are not di¤erentiable everywhere -
they have a kink at strategies s¡i where the interior and the boundary solutions of the
utility maximization problem coincide - we can not immediately apply Theorem 6 to f .
Consider therefore the functions hi : R !R, i 2 f1; 2; 3g
h1 (s¡1) = 0:5 (1 ¡ s2 ¡ s3 ¡ c)
h2 (s¡2) = 0:5 (1 ¡ s1 ¡ s3 ¡ c)
h3 (s¡3) = 0:5 (1 ¡ s1 ¡ (1¡ ")s2¡ c)
resulting from an unrestricted maximization of (3) overR, and observe that T-contractivity
of the unbounded maximizers h = £i2Ihi entails T-contractivity of the bounded max-
imizers f. Hence, we can establish T-contractivity of f by showing that h satis…es
condition (i) or condition (ii) of Theorem 6.
Note that h is not 1-contractive according to the conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 6;
however, we can show 2-contraction in the supremum norm (hT satisfying condition (i)
for T = 2) as well as in the absolute value norm (hT satisfying condition (ii) for T = 2).
To see this verify at …rst that the functions h2i , i 2 f1; 2; 3g, are given by
h21 (s) = 0:25 (2s1+ (1 ¡ ")s2 + s3 +2c)
h22 (s) = 0:25 (s1 + (2 ¡ ") s2 + s3 +2c)
h23 (s) = 0:25 (" + (1¡ ")s1 + s2+ (2 ¡ ")s3 +2c)
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It is now easy to see that, e.g., condition (ii) is satis…ed since
X
j2I
¯¯¯¯
@h2i
@sj
(s)
¯¯¯¯
· 1¡ 0:25"
for all i and all s 2 S . We can therefore conclude that there exists a unique point-
rationalizable output decision in our model of Cournot competition with three …rms
whenever " > 0. Moreover, …rm i’s unique point-rationalizable strategy is given by its
Nash equilibrium strategy
s¤i =
1¡ c
4
i 2 f1; 2; 3g.
Remark. Recall the de…nition of the function hT and observe that a partial deriva-
tive evaluated at s, @h
T
i
@sj
(s), can be computed via successive applications of the chain-rule
as follows:
@h1i
@sj
(s) =
@hi
@sj
(s)
@hTi
@sj
(s) =
X
k6=i
@hi
@sk
@hT¡1k
@sj
(s)
Thus, instead of …rst determining the entire function h21 in order to derive the partial
derivatives @h
2
1
@s1
, @h
2
1
@s2
, and @h
2
1
@s3
, we could have obtained these partial derivatives more easily
by the following computations:
@h21
@s1
(s) =
@h1
@s2
@h2
@s1
(s) +
@h1
@s3
@h3
@s1
(s) = 0:25 + 0:25 = 0:5
@h21
@s2
(s) =
@h1
@s2
@h2
@s2
(s) +
@h1
@s3
@h3
@s2
(s) = 0 + 0:25 (1¡ ") = 0:25 (1 ¡ ")
@h21
@s3
(s) =
@h1
@s2
@h2
@s3
(s) +
@h1
@s3
@h3
@s3
(s) = 0:25 + 0 = 0:25
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have studied uniqueness conditions for the speci…c iterative solution
concept of point-rationalizability. Di¤erent iterative solution concepts di¤er in their
de…nition of unreasonable strategies. On the one hand, rationalizability concepts have
in common that any strategy which is not a best response to some belief is regarded
as unreasonable. However, there are di¤erent de…nitions of relevant beliefs: Besides the
assumption of degenerated point-beliefs by point-rationalizability we can encounter, e.g.,
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independent versus arbitrarily correlated additive beliefs (cf. Bernheim 1984, Pearce
1984), or non-additive beliefs (Ghirardato and Le Breton 1997). On the other hand,
dominance solution concepts regard a strategy as unreasonable if it is dominated by
another strategy. Here di¤erent de…nitions of domination - e.g., weakly versus strongly
dominated, or/and dominated with respect to mixed versus pure strategies (cf. Moulin
1984, Börgers 1993) - give rise to di¤erent dominance solution concepts.
The uniqueness conditions of this paper with regard to point-rationalizability do
not necessarily imply uniqueness for weaker iterative solution concepts like, e.g., cor-
related rationalizability (cf. Bernheim 1984, Pearce 1984) or iterated elimination of
strongly dominated strategies. In contrast to these weaker iterative solution concepts
point-rationalizability may eliminate strategies that appear intuitively reasonable. Con-
sider the following payo¤-matrix of a two-player game
B
A
beat bite
allow $2 $0 -$1Mill $1
assist $1 $1 $1 $0
avoid -$1Mill $0 $2 $1
To assist is not a best choice against any point-belief of A: if A believed that B beats
then A would allow, and if A believed that B bites then A would avoid. Moreover, when
we go through further iterative steps of the point-rationalizability concept we arrive at
(avoid, bite) as the unique point-rationalizable solution of the game. However, in this
example all strategies survive iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies and
they are even correlated rationalizable: Suppose A conceived beat and bite as equally
likely. Then it may be reasonable for A to assist because she could avoid by this choice
the subjectively perceived 0:5 chance of losing 1Mill. which may in turn justify B’s
decision to beat...
Despite these interpretational ‡aws there are three reasons why this paper’s unique-
ness results are interesting.
First, a unique point-rationalizable strategy is also the unique Nash equilibrium of
the game. Thus, even when we are rather interested in equilibrium solutions, and not
in iterative solutions, we can use the results of this paper to establish existence and
uniqueness of Nash equilibria.
Second, as already argued in the introduction, point-rationalizability o¤ers a possible
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explanation of how players can coordinate themselves towards equilibrium play in one-
shot strategic situations. We think that such an explanation of equilibrium play, even
if sometimes ‡awed, is still favorable to the mere assumption that players won’t be
disappointed by the actual course of play in the solution of a game.
Finally, there exist several results in the literature that identify conditions under
which di¤erent iterative solution concepts are equivalent. For example, the nice games
of Moulin (1984), i.e., games with strictly quasiconcave utility functions and convex real-
valued individual strategy sets, guarantee equivalence of the point-rationalizable solution
and of the dominance solution that results from iterated elimination of strongly dom-
inated strategies. Since the iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies is the
weakest iterative solution concept we can think of the unique point rationalizable solution
of a nice game is the unique solution of this game according to any perceivable iterative
solution concept. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) show that increasing utility di¤erences
and supermodular utility functions, as assumed in so-called supermodular games, imply
(basically) equivalence of all iterative solution concepts if the point rationalizable solu-
tion is unique. Furthermore, Zimper (2003) generalizes Milgrom and Roberts’ result to
decreasing utility di¤erences. Thus, for games satisfying those equivalence conditions
this paper’s uniqueness conditions for point-rationalizability imply a unique solution with
regard to every iterative solution concept. Moreover, because the equivalence conditions
in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and in Zimper (2003) include uniqueness of the point-
rationalizable solution, this paper’s uniqueness results contribute directly to equivalence
results for iterative solution concepts.
7 Appendix: More Proofs
Proof of Theorem 4: Let d be the discrete metric, i.e., d (s; t) = 0 for s = t and
d (s; t) = 1 else. Obviously, if fm (s) = fm (t) for all s; t 2 S then d (fm (s) ; fm (t)) <
d (s; t) for all s 6= t since d (fm (s) ; fm (t)) = 0. Hence, f is m-contractive and there
exists a unique point-rationalizable solution by Theorem 3. It remains to show that
m-contractivity is also necessary for uniqueness. Consider the …nite sequence
s; f (s) ; f 2 (s) ; :::; fm (s)
of m + 1 elements and observe that this sequence must contain fk (s) and fh (s), with
k < h, such that f k (s) = fh (s). If fm¡1 (s) 6= fm (s) there can not exist a unique
point-rationalizable solution because of f k (s) ; f k+1 (s) ; :::; fh¡1 (s) ; fh (s) 2 P (G) (cf.
Observation 1). Consequently, a unique point-rationalizable solution requires fm¡1 (s) =
fm (s) and fm¡1 (t) = fm (t) for any s; t 2 S . Suppose now there exists a unique
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point-rationalizable solution and assume fm (s) 6= fm (t) for some s; t 2 S. But since
fm¡1 (s) = fm (s) and fm¡1 (t) = fm (t) Observation 1 implies fm (s) ; fm (t) 2 P (G).
Thus, the condition fm (s) = fm (t) is necessary for uniqueness.¤
Proof of Theorem 5: If S is complete then continuity and T-contraction of the
best response function imply the existence of a (unique) …xed point s¤ = f (s¤) (cf.
Theorem 1.3 in Bonsall 1962), i.e., P (G) is nonempty. Furthermore, since S is bounded
and ¸k (S) ½ ¸k¡1 (S) for k 2 N, there exists for each set ¸k (S) a …nite diameter
diam
¡
¸k (S)
¢
. Due to diam
¡
¸k (S)
¢ ¸ d¡sk; tk¢ for all sk; tk 2 ¸k (S), T-contraction
implies d
¡
sk+T ; tk+T
¢ · c ¤ diam ¡¸k (S)¢ for all sk+T ; tk+T 2 ¸k+T (S). Observe now
that
if there is some sk+T; tk+T 2 ¸k+T (S) with d ¡sk+T ; tk+T ¢ = c ¤ diam ¡¸k (S)¢ then
diam
¡
¸k+T (S)
¢
= c ¤ diam ¡¸k (S)¢, and
if d
¡
sk+T ; tk+T
¢
< c ¤ diam ¡¸k (S)¢ for all sk+T ; tk+T 2 ¸k+T (S) then
diam
¡
¸k+T (S)
¢ · c ¤ diam ¡¸k (S)¢
Consequently
diam
¡
¸k+T (S)
¢ · c ¤ diam ¡¸k (S)¢
for k ¸ 0 and we obtain under the assumption c < 1 the desired uniqueness result
lim
k!1
diam
¡
¸k (S)
¢
= lim
n!1diam
¡
¸n¤T (S)
¢ · lim
n!1 c
n ¤ diam (S) = 0
¤
Proof of Theorem 6:
Part (i). Let gi (¸) = fTi (¸ (s¡ t) + t), and observe that gi (¸) is continuously
di¤erentiable on [0; 1]. The mean-value inequality for real-valued functions with a real-
valued domain implies
jgi (1)¡ gi (0)j ·
¯¯¯¯
@gi
@¸
(¸¤)
¯¯¯¯
¤ j1 ¡ 0j (4)
for some ¸¤ such that ¸¤ = argmax[0;1]
¯¯
@gi
@¸ (¸)
¯¯
. By an application of the chain-rule:
@gi
@¸
(¸¤) =
X
j2I
@fTi
@sj
(¸¤ (sj ¡ tj) + tj) ¤ (sj ¡ tj)
¯¯¯¯
@gi
@¸
(¸¤)
¯¯¯¯
·
¯¯¯¯
¯X
j2I
@fTi
@sj
(¸¤ (sj ¡ tj) + tj)
¯¯¯¯
¯ ¤ ks¡ tk1
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Substituting for the terms in inequality (4):
¯¯
f Ti (s)¡ f Ti (t)
¯¯
·
¯¯¯¯
¯X
j2I
@fTi
@sj
(r)
¯¯¯¯
¯ ¤ ks¡ tk1
with r = ¸¤ (s¡ t) + t. Since this is true by assumption for all i 2 I we obtain for the
supremum norm
°°f T (s)¡ f T (t)°°1 ·
¯¯¯¯
¯X
j2I
@fTi
@sj
(r)
¯¯¯¯
¯ ¤ ks¡ tk1
Consequently, condition (i) of Theorem 6 implies T-contraction of f in the supremum
norm.
Note that we have here T-contraction, and not only T-contractivity, because
P
j2I
¯¯¯
@fTi
@sj
(s)
¯¯¯
is a continuous function such that it obtains a maximum on the compact set S . Conse-
quently, if
P
j2I
¯¯¯
@fTi
@sj
(s)
¯¯¯
< 1 for all i and all s 2 S then there exists some c < 1 such
that
P
j2I
¯¯¯
@fTi
@sj
(s)
¯¯¯
· c for all i.
Part (ii) Let again gi (¸) = f Ti (¸ (s¡ t) + t), and observe that the mean-value
inequality implies
jgi (1)¡ gi (0)j ·
¯¯¯¯
@gi
@¸
¡
¸i
¢¯¯¯¯ ¤ j1¡ 0j
for some ¸i = arg max[0;1]
¯¯
@gi
@¸ (¸)
¯¯
. By the chain-rule and substitution
¯¯
fTi (s) ¡ fTi (t)
¯¯
·
¯¯¯¯
¯X
j2I
@fTi
@sj
¡
ri
¢ ¤ (sj ¡ tj)
¯¯¯¯
¯ (5)
with ri = ¸is+
¡
1¡ ¸i¢ t. Summing up over all i and rearranging
X
i2I
¯¯
fTi (s) ¡ fTi (t)
¯¯
·
X
i2I
¯¯¯¯
¯X
j2I
µ
@fTi
@sj
¡
ri
¢¶ ¤ (sj ¡ tj)
¯¯¯¯
¯
X
i2I
¯¯
fTi (s) ¡ fTi (t)
¯¯ · max
j2I
(¯¯¯¯
¯X
i2I
µ
@fTi
@sj
¡
ri
¢¶¯¯¯¯¯
)
¤
X
j2I
jsj ¡ tjj°°fT (s) ¡ fT (t)°°
1
< ks¡ tk1
Where the last step follows from the assumption
P
i2I
³
@fTi
@sj
(ri)
´
< 1 for all j and
all ri 2 f¸s+ (1¡ ¸) t j ¸ 2 [0;1]g. Consequently, d¡fT (s) ; fT (t)¢ < d (s; t) with d
induced by the absolute value norm. Thus, condition (ii) of Theorem 6 implies T-
contraction in the absolute value norm.¤
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